Comments on: The Ontological Proof http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11 Ian Lance Taylor Tue, 18 Nov 2008 21:57:04 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=1.5.2 Comment on The Ontological Proof by: fche http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-13 Tue, 03 Jan 2006 20:19:21 +0000 http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-13 It may be interesting to read how exactly Aquinas etc. reason "logical contradictions" as an ungodly behaviors, but miracles as godly ones. It's as if a contradiction in the platonic abstract world is verboten, but a contradiction in the natural world is okay. It may be interesting to read how exactly Aquinas etc. reason “logical contradictions” as an ungodly behaviors, but miracles as godly ones. It’s as if a contradiction in the platonic abstract world is verboten, but a contradiction in the natural world is okay.

]]> Comment on The Ontological Proof by: Ian Lance Taylor http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-12 Tue, 03 Jan 2006 18:34:38 +0000 http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-12 The Scholastic philosophers, including Saint Anselm and, most famously, Thomas Aquinas, thought about what it means to say that God is omnipotent. They took it to mean that God can do anything which is not a logical contradiction. For example, God can not make an object which is a single color which is both green and non-green, because that would be a contradiction. On the other hand, God could certainly make the object appear green to some people and non-green to other people. You're right of course that God could change my mind and make me think that I am still me. When I say that I would be a different person, I'm basically making a definitional statement. More generally, I was trying to get at the idea that people's beliefs are not like light switches. You can't flip them independently. They are interconnected at many levels. Changing one belief means changing the whole system. God can presumably bypass that in some supernatural way. But if we assume that God will want me to continue to be a normal human with no supernatural adjunct, then it is not possible to change one belief in isolation. But in any case I agree that God could certainly arrange for me to believe that I am still me. The Scholastic philosophers, including Saint Anselm and, most famously, Thomas Aquinas, thought about what it means to say that God is omnipotent. They took it to mean that God can do anything which is not a logical contradiction. For example, God can not make an object which is a single color which is both green and non-green, because that would be a contradiction. On the other hand, God could certainly make the object appear green to some people and non-green to other people.

You’re right of course that God could change my mind and make me think that I am still me. When I say that I would be a different person, I’m basically making a definitional statement.

More generally, I was trying to get at the idea that people’s beliefs are not like light switches. You can’t flip them independently. They are interconnected at many levels. Changing one belief means changing the whole system. God can presumably bypass that in some supernatural way. But if we assume that God will want me to continue to be a normal human with no supernatural adjunct, then it is not possible to change one belief in isolation. But in any case I agree that God could certainly arrange for me to believe that I am still me.

]]> Comment on The Ontological Proof by: fche http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-11 Tue, 03 Jan 2006 17:02:51 +0000 http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-11 ... or rather, she can make you think that you are the same person, despite the interference. That's one problem with the notions such as omnipotence. They seem to be either too fluffy ("can do anything!") or paradoxical ("can lift the unliftable?") or redefined as convenient ("can do anything, except those things that cause problems for my argument" :-). … or rather, she can make you think that you are the same person, despite the interference.

That’s one problem with the notions such as omnipotence. They seem to be either too fluffy (”can do anything!”) or paradoxical (”can lift the unliftable?”) or redefined as convenient (”can do anything, except those things that cause problems for my argument” :-) .

]]> Comment on The Ontological Proof by: Ian Lance Taylor http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-8 Sat, 31 Dec 2005 21:06:42 +0000 http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-8 > > I don’t believe that an omnipotent being can cease being omnipotent. > Maybe, but I’ll bet she can make you believe otherwise. I know it's just a joke, but I want to point out that it may be incorrect. Clearly God could simply present arguments to convince me that I am wrong--an approach which is available to any thinking person. But I don't think it's coherent to argue that God could reach down and simply change my beliefs, because that would turn me into a different person. That is, there would be a new person, similar to me, with different beliefs, but it would not be me. > > I don’t believe that an omnipotent being can cease being omnipotent.

> Maybe, but I’ll bet she can make you believe otherwise.

I know it’s just a joke, but I want to point out that it may be incorrect. Clearly God could simply present arguments to convince me that I am wrong–an approach which is available to any thinking person. But I don’t think it’s coherent to argue that God could reach down and simply change my beliefs, because that would turn me into a different person. That is, there would be a new person, similar to me, with different beliefs, but it would not be me.

]]> Comment on The Ontological Proof by: fche http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-6 Sat, 31 Dec 2005 14:19:43 +0000 http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-6 > I don’t believe that an omnipotent being can cease being omnipotent. Maybe, but I'll bet she can make you believe otherwise. > I don’t believe that an omnipotent being can cease being omnipotent.

Maybe, but I’ll bet she can make you believe otherwise.

]]> Comment on The Ontological Proof by: tromey http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-4 Sun, 25 Dec 2005 23:27:09 +0000 http://www.airs.com/blog/archives/11#comment-4 I was thinking about this today, and there is an even more fundamental objection to step 2. Namely, nothing in our experience indicates that something that exists is more perfect than something that does not exist. Quite the opposite in fact -- for instance we talk of Platonic ideals, which are the superior form; with reality being shadows projected on a wall. Also the imperfection of reality is a common, and generally well-founded, argument against Marxism, anarchism, libertarianism, and other idealist doctrines. I think this is actually a proof that God is an idea, or more likely that the concept of "perfection" is somehow incoherent. I was thinking about this today, and there is an even more
fundamental objection to step 2. Namely, nothing in our experience
indicates that something that exists is more perfect than something that
does not exist. Quite the opposite in fact — for instance we talk of Platonic
ideals, which are the superior form; with reality being shadows projected
on a wall. Also the imperfection of reality is a common, and generally
well-founded, argument against Marxism, anarchism, libertarianism, and
other idealist doctrines.

I think this is actually a proof that God is an idea, or more likely that the concept
of “perfection” is somehow incoherent.

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